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“I am Spartacus” – Privacy Enhancing Technologies and 
Privacy as a Public Good.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the technology for an obfuscation based method for 
privacy enhancing tools, which serves the dual function of protecting the 
reputation and privacy of data subjects, while at the same time protecting 
legitimate police interests in the confidentiality of an investigation. Unlike most 
other approaches to PET, in our model for an “Investigative Data Acquisition 
Platform” the protection of privacy is seen as a communal task, something 
that we call for reasons that will become apparent below the “Spartacus 
model” of data protection. This approach requires us however to reconsider 
2 
 
not just the doctrinal legal environment of privacy and data protection law, but 
also its jurisprudential, ethical and sociological underpinnings. Most 
approaches to PET reflect the individualistic, libertarian origins of privacy law 
as an individual right. By contrast, our approach asks how PET can look like 
in a society that considers privacy a common good and the protection of 
privacy a communal task, an understanding of privacy law that has recently 
gained much ground in the academic debate. In the first part of the paper, we 
therefore describe the motivation for this approach in the form of an extended 
use case, which allows us to give an informal outline of the solution suggested 
here. This will prepare the ground for a legal-jurisprudential analysis that is 
needed for the normative underpinning of the technology. In the second part, 
we introduce the formal apparatus that supports this type of communal 
privacy protection. In the third part, we provide a short evaluation of the 
results, both from a technological and from a legal and ethical perspective, 
indicating also a number of necessary further research questions, in particular 
empirical and socio-legal questions regarding common perception of privacy 
and risks.  
 
1.1 Setting the scene: Obfuscation and privacy protection  
Consider as a setting for the discussion in this paper the following example of 
a traditional, brick and mortar police investigation: The police wants to check 
the alibi of a suspect, John Doe. They drive in a marked police car to his place 
of residence, park it in full view on the street next to his house, and then send 
pairs of uniformed police officers from neighbour to neighbour, asking if they 
saw Mr Doe at his home during a certain time interval.  
This sort of scenario carries two obvious risks: one is a reputation risk for Mr 
Doe. His neighbours now know at the very least that he is for one reason or 
other suspected of a wrongdoing.  They might also be able to infer from the 
question some of the information the police holds about Mr Doe – if for 
instance they are asked for a specific time interval, and it is well known that 
during that time a robbery happened nearby, it would be obvious to infer that 
Mr Doe is suspect in a robbery. If the question is: “Have you ever seen very 
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young girls visiting your neighbour late at night”, another inference would 
immediately be drawn.  
At the same time, this approach also carries risks for the police – the 
neighbours may inadvertently or intentionally alert Mr Doe that he is subject to 
a police investigation. One way to protect both the interest of Mr Doe in 
preventing the disclosure of information about him (here, that he is subject to 
a police inquiry) and the interest of the police not to alert Mr Doe is to ask 
questions that are much broader phrased. This could be e.g. asking every 
person on that street, including Mr Doe, to list everybody whom they saw in 
the neighbourhood at the relevant time. This way, there is no finger of 
suspicion that points at one specific person. But this strategy carries obvious 
costs too. It creates much more information than necessary, most of it noise, 
which the police then has to process. It also creates a privacy risk for a much 
larger number of people – the police now knows about the whereabouts of a 
large number of citizens it has no legitimate interests in. Nonetheless, creating 
an excess amount of information seems, paradoxically, to be one way of 
protecting privacy and integrity of the investigation   
We can now transfer this scenario to the internet, for instance a request to an 
ISP for data that establishes when a suspect was online, or a request to a 
bank about online transactions carried out by a client. We assume here and in 
the following that the data was legitimately held by that company, either 
because it is necessary to fulfil its contractual obligation with Mr Doe, or 
because there is statutory data retention duty imposed on them. We also 
assume that the police warrant is legitimate and necessary. At this point, we 
face the same dilemma as described above – the formal request for 
information discloses to the data controller that the police has a legitimate 
interest in one of their clients. This in turn might give the data controller an 
incentive for action. A bank for instance may decide to disassociate 
themselves from a client who has been frequently the subject of data 
discloser requests, on the assumption that he carries a risk for reputation 
damage should he become subject of a high profile trial. This in turn may alert 
the client to investigative activities against him. Concerns about cybercrime 
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and terrorism has resulted in a considerable extension of data retention duties 
by internet service providers, which add to the already significant data online 
retailers, banks or social media providers hold about their clients. For the 
purpose of criminal investigations, channels have been created that allow the 
police under certain circumstances, defined in law, to demand access. In the 
aftermath of 2001, public authorities were granted much wider rights to gather 
operational data (Swire & Steinfeld, 2002; Young, Kathleen, Joshua, & 
Meredith, 2006). For a number of years public opinion accepted privacy 
intrusions as the sacrifice everybody must make. However, slowly the public 
opinion is shifting back to the state were intrusion of privacy is considered as 
unacceptable. This is shown by different surveys such as the one conducted 
by the Washington Post in 2006 (Balz & Deane, 2006), where 32% of 
respondents agreed that they would prefer federal government to ensure that 
privacy rights are respected rather than to investigate possible terrorist 
threats. This was 11% increase from the similar survey conducted in 2003 
However, while this indicates a general societal willingness “to do something” 
about privacy during police investigations, the “obfuscation” method described 
above – asking much wider, less focussed questions – can’t easily be 
transferred to an online environment. The formal procedure that is required to 
gain data access requires that the query is sufficiently precise and focussed, 
to prevent fishing expeditions and unnecessary privacy intrusions of innocent 
citizens. In Europe, the Data Protection Directive allows national police forces 
access to data only “in specific cases.” As Bignami (2007) noted, this 
provision is explicitly designed to prohibit high-tech fishing expeditions, 
whether done by the police or by market actors. Again Bignami:  
“The police cannot make blanket requests for calling information. 
Rather, they must compile detailed requests for information on specific 
telephone numbers. The requirement of specificity is a means of 
guaranteeing that the police have at least some grounds for suspecting 
those telephone numbers of being involved in a criminal conspiracy.” 
Paradoxically therefore, a method that could in principled protect citizens from 
the misuse of their data prohibits certain privacy enhancing methods.  
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Nonetheless, using obfuscation is an attractive privacy enhancing tool in 
principle. In the online scenario, it is the protection of the interests of third 
parties that prevents us to hide the identity of Mr Doe behind a veil of “excess 
data”. This however would change if a sufficient number of other clients of the 
company in question waived their rights, and under the assumption of 
mutuality and reciprocity provide the “fog” of data that shields the identity of 
the subject of a data query from the data controller, though not the police. The 
bank or ISP will in this model only know that the subject of the query is 
amongst the arbitrarily large number of records they are asked to hand over to 
the police. The police in turn must only able to read amongst all the data 
handed over to them the data of the person they are interested in. We will see 
below how a combination of a trusted third party approach together with 
encryption methods can provide just such a set up.   
 A particularly intuitive example of such a solidarity based protection of 
Identity against a data query though comes from the film “Spartacus”. In one 
of the most climatic scenes of the film, a Roman general  demands from the 
captured remains of the former slave army that they turn Spartacus over to 
him. To protect his friends, Spartacus stands up to say "I am Spartacus." 
However, the solidarity of his soldiers is so great that several of them come 
forward, shouting "I am Spartacus!" until the shouts dissolve into a cacophony 
of thousands of former slaves each claiming "I am Spartacus!”. This makes it 
impossible for the general to identify and arrest Spartacus. This story also 
points to one of the main issues that technology alone cannot tackle – the 
legal and social environment necessary for such an approach to work. 
Enlightened self-interest plays a role, and our  model will assume reciprocity: 
I’m willing to accept a (ideally very low) privacy risk to myself when making my 
data available as “fog”, but I know that should I ever be at the centre of an 
investigation, others will do the same for me. As the Spartacus example 
shows, people are sometimes willing to take personal risks for a communal 
good. This requires us however to reconsider the normative foundations of 
privacy law. Using obfuscation as a means to protect privacy is by no means 
new – and other writers have made the connection to the film too. (e.g. Howe 
and Nissenbaum 2009). However, as Brunton and Nissenbaum note, most of 
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these approaches still put the burden to produce the excess data on the 
individual who wants to protect herself. This is a situation very different from 
the one encountered in Spartacus, and indeed our proposed solution. The few 
examples of collective obfuscation that they identify are typically “low tech”, 
e.g. swapping of loyalty cards, do not involve any risk for the collaborators 
and are directed against illegitimate privacy intrusions by private companies. 
Our problem, and hence our solution, differs in all these aspects. First, 
existing methods of collaborative obfuscation are low technology approaches 
by grassroot activists trying to undermine corporate data mining in the long 
run, which would not work in the type of scenario we discuss, a sophisticated 
online investigation for a single, specific event. Furthermore, in our scenario 
there is a legitimate police investigation, and whatever method we chose to 
protect Doe’s privacy interests, they must not interfere with the legitimate 
exercise of police functions. Indeed, as we indicated above, protecting Doe’s 
privacy is in the interest of both him and the police – an approach which we 
hope will help to revise the often overly simplistic concept of privacy as an 
irreconcilable conflict between police and individuals. Finally, it is worth 
remembering the outcome of Spartacus, the movie. Unable to identify 
Spartacus, General Crassus crucifies all of the slaves. In our approach too, 
and in marked difference to previous approaches to collective obfuscation, 
people will be asked to expose themselves to a – very  limited – risk, 
something necessitated by the specific characteristics of our scenario. 
Because of this not inconsiderable demand we make on other users, it is 
necessary to spend a bit more time on the philosophical and jurisprudential 
underpinnings of our approach, and generally the nature of privacy, to 
legitimate and put into context this demand. 
1.2 Privacy as a public good and a public responsibility 
Privacy has traditionally been framed in law as a paradigmatic case of an 
individual right that pitches the self-interest of individual against the communal 
interest of the state. This is a feature it shares with a traditional understanding 
of human rights law in general, as individual rights that protect against state 
action only. To a degree, we can read this even from the etymology of the 
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word. “Privacy” is derived from the Latin “privare” – to rob or to deprive. Our 
private time was for the ever egregious Romans the time when we robbed our 
friends from of pleasure of our company, and the time we deprived the state 
of our service. This perception remains to a degree with us today. Privacy is in 
public discourse often portrayed as ultimately selfish, and in the age of social 
media if not anti-social, then at least a-social. Only recently, an alternative 
discourse in human rights scholarship has emerged, which portraits privacy 
itself as a social or public value on which other important public goods, in 
particular democracy and public participation rests. Privacy enables 
individuals to criticise and resist measures or acts of government that are of 
an undemocratic or even totalitarian nature. It has therefore been suggested 
that privacy is necessary to protect individuals from the pressure to conform to 
societal expectations in a way that poses a threat not only to human dignity 
and a person’s individuality, but also to the liberty that flows from it. Equally, 
Simitis (1984 p.399) argued forcefully that even tough privacy has often been 
misunderstood as conflicting with transparency, free speech and other 
democracy enhancing  concepts, its role in fostering participation musty not 
be overlooked. Even earlier, Bloustein  (1964 p1003) argued that 
“[t]he man who is compelled to live every minute of his life 
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy 
or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived 
of his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual 
merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never 
to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to 
be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly 
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth 
and to become the feelings of every man.  
And indeed, the experience in many totalitarian regimes has shown that an 
absence of privacy has the potential for creating a “society of followers”.  
This interdependency between the protection of privacy and the protection of 
other essential features of a democratic society is also highlighted by Raab 
(2011) who argues that values like personal autonomy and self-determination 
8 
 
“are important not primarily because individuals may wish to 
live in isolation (for they do not, mostly), but so that they can 
participate in social and political relationships at various levels 
of scale, and so that they can undertake projects and pursue 
their own goals”. 
While this shift towards the recognition of privacy as a public good is 
welcome, for our purpose it has the problem that much of the reassessment 
also resulted in questioning the role of consent and privacy waivers. As long 
as privacy was seen merely as an individual right, governments found it easy 
to convince individuals of the legitimacy of a privacy-security trade-off. 
Similarly, free social media services such as Facebook offer essentially a 
“trade in” between privacy and free use of services, paid for by advertising 
revenue. This turned privacy into a tradable object under the control of the 
rights holder, and marginalised the concept of “privacy risk”. How valuable is 
privacy if so many people are willing to trade it in for mere pennies in 
discounts when shopping with a loyalty card, or hit points in an online game? 
Just as privacy became in this model private property, so did privacy risks, 
which were conceptualised  as only one of a number of competing risks and 
benefits such as fear of crime, loss of convenience1 or loss of material gain. 
Theories that emphasise the value of privacy as a common good therefore 
also became sceptical of the notion of free alienation of privacy in market 
places, and with that the role of individual consent. As Regan  (1995 p. 233)  
argues, there is a risk that  
“[i]f one individual or a group of individuals waives privacy 
rights, the level of privacy for all individuals decreases 
because the value of privacy [in the collective view of society] 
decreases”. 
Or put differently, in a society where “Big Brother” is daytime television and 
everybody shares their feelings on Facebook or Twitter, refusing to participate 
in the sharing of data is at best mildly odd, at worst in itself suspicious. In an 
administrative or law enforcement context, this means that an already existing 
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“information imbalance” between citizens and the state is further shifted in the 
state’s favour. We have to be careful therefore that our own approach and its 
use of “consent”, does not inadvertently undermine this very notion of 
solidarity which is crucially dependent on the legal conceptualisation of 
privacy as a common good. Technology, institutional arrangements and law 
all play an important role in this balancing act.  
These preliminary jurisprudential reflections provide us with an abstract 
normative framework for the technological solution to protect the privacy of 
people caught for whatever reasons on the police radar during an 
investigation. It assumes that the protection of privacy is not just a task for the 
individual, but a communal concern, based on solidarity and not (just) self-
interest. The aim is a solution where through solidarity in a community, the 
identity of a suspect is protected, without interfering with legitimate police 
interests. This requires reassurances, technological, institutional and legal, for 
those people who are willing to assist in the protection of each other’s privacy.  
In the next section, we introduce our proposal for a “Data Acquisition 
Platform” (IDAP), focussing mainly on the first aspect, how the necessary trust 
can be created that allows actions of solidarity.  
2 Introducing IDAP.2  
2.1 BACKGROUNG AND RELATED WORK 
Leaving the investigative context aside, the retrieval of information from a 
third-party in a private manner is a generic problem that has been researched 
for use in a variety of different scenarios such as cooperative scientific 
computation (Du and Atallah 2001); and on-line auctions (Cachin, 1999). The 
things people search for disclose potentially a lot about them. This  is after all 
the central part of Google’s business model – online behavioural profiling 
based on search queries allows the targeting of advertising with a high degree 
of accuracy (Tene 2008). More and more often, analysing search queries by 
suspects also play a role in criminal investigations, establishing motives, 
methods and state of mind (Lawless 2007). Initially, Private Information 
                                               
2 A more detailed description of the technical aspects of IDAP can be found in the 2011 PhD 
thesis of one of the authors,  Kwecka, Cryptographic privacy-preserving enhancement 
method for investigative data acquisition. http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/4437/ 
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Retrieval (PIR) protocols were designed with a basic requirement of acquiring 
an interesting data record, or just a specific data bit, from a dataholder, 
sender, in a way that this dataholder is unable to judge which record is of 
interest to the requestor, chooser. These protocols were not concerned with 
the secrecy of the records stored in the database, thus in its least optimised 
state a PIR could have been achieved by transferring the whole database 
from the sender to the chooser, as this would allow the chooser to retrieve a 
record in a private manner. To use a very simple analogy, if an individual 
wants to browse the offerings of an online retailer of medical self-help books, 
but does not want to leave a trail that indicates to the retailer unnecessarily 
which illness he may suffer from, downloading the catalogue in pdf and 
searching it in the privacy of his own home has advantages over online 
browsing. There are no privacy concerns on the side of the retailer in this 
case, as all the information is public anyway. Consequently, the main 
motivation behind the PIR schemes is achieving minimal communicational 
and computational complexity (Ostrovsky & William E. Skeith III, 2007). A 
stronger notion than PIR is 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitive that 
allows the retrieval of a randomly selected record from the dataset of n 
elements held by the sender in a way that the sender cannot learn which 
record has been transferred, and the chooser cannot learn anything about 
other records in the dataset (Schneier, 1995). 1-out-of-n OT protocols that 
allow chooser to actively select a record to be retrieved, and that have linear 
or sub-linear complexity, can be referred to as symmetric PIR (SPIR) 
protocols, since they protect the records of both parties during the information 
retrieval. These useful privacy-preserving data retrieval protocols can be 
employed in a variety of systems: electronic watch-lists of suspects (Frikken & 
Atallah, 2003); cooperative scientific computation (Du & Atallah, 2001; 
Goldwasser & Lindell, 2002); and on-line auctions (Cachin, 1999). Frikken’s 
and Atallah’s approach deserves some further comments, as it shares some 
of the technological solutions with our proposal, but due to a very different 
legal-ethical approach to privacy advocates an implementation that acerbates 
rather than reduces the specific issue we want to address. A typical 
application for their solution is the following: the police have received 
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information that some known suspects are planning a bomb attack, possibly 
using fertiliser. They want to query the database of a fertiliser retailer, ideally 
without alerting the retailer on the identity of their suspects. This can have 
several reasons, including suspicions against the retailer himself. As indicated 
above, one obvious solution would be to simply request the entire database, 
or data about everybody who bought fertiliser, and analyse it on a police 
server. However, this would mean that the police also gets hold of data about 
a large number of innocent citizens – with the fear that they might e.g. re-use 
the data to check it against tax records or other types of investigative activity 
which is perceived by the population as marginal in comparison to terrorism. 
Frikken’s and Atallah’s solution is to provide the police not with the entire 
database of the retailer, but a segment of it that is sufficiently large to hide 
their interest in a specific person from the retailer. To protect the wider public 
though, the selection of data is determined by an objective criterion such as a 
list of people with previous criminal records, possibly for related offences. This 
minimises the privacy risk for innocent citizens. It does however potentially 
increase the privacy risk for people on the lists from which selection takes 
place substantially. The retailer could in this case learn that a number of his 
customers have previous records, or have come to the attention of the police 
in some other way. We can see now the different jurisprudential assumptions 
behind their model and ours: In Frikken and Atallah, privacy is a conditional 
right that can be lost through misbehaviour. This does not just apply to the 
suspect in an investigation – who can reasonably suffer restrictions in his 
privacy to further the aims of the criminal justice system. Rather, once 
convicted of a criminal offence, the offender suffers in perpetuity reduced 
privacy rights, even in cases that have nothing to do with him and only 
accidentally concern him. Where our model is based on the voluntary 
solidarity between all citizens (whether or not they have a previous record, or 
are on a police watch list), in their model a subset of the citizenry, those who 
for one reason or the other have already become subject to police interest, 
are forced to provide the cover for the investigators.  
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 With the use of the protocols described above, a chooser would be capable 
of privately retrieving a record from the sender’s database, by secretly 
referring to its index in this database. In SPIR such index is expected to be 
publically available in an electronic catalogue or a directory (Aiello, Ishai, & 
Reingold, 2001; Bao & Deng, 2001). However, ISPs and other dataholders 
with large databases of private data cannot be expected to maintain such 
freely available indexes. Also, it is expected that an investigator would 
normally refer to a suspect by name, ID or phone number, etc. For this reason 
before the data can be received using SPIR, a search would need to be 
performed by the chooser against the records in the sender’s database. Such 
a private search operation requires a protocol that allows two parties to 
compare the values of their data in a private manner. The protocols that are 
optimised to make comparisons for equality are referred to as Private Equality 
Test (PEqT) protocols. PEqT protocols are often based on commutative 
(Frikken & Atallah, 2003; Kwecka et. al. 2008) or homomorphic cryptosystems 
(Bao & Deng, 2001).  
 
An interesting record can be located in a database using a 1-out-of-n PEqT 
protocol and then retrieved with help of SPIR. Often each of these protocols 
would have a separate computationally expensive preparation phases, such 
solution would not be optimal for IDAP. The exception to this rule is a range of 
protocols including: private intersection; private intersection size; and Private 
Equijoin (PE) defined in (Agrawal, Evfimievski, & Srikant, 2003). These 
protocols are based on commutative encryption and thanks to the use of 
different properties of the underlying commutative algorithms are capable of 
allowing for both private matching and private data retrieval.  
 
2.2 BUILDING BLOCKS 
This section describes the PE protocol that is the basis for the creation of the 
privacy preserving investigative platform - IDAP. The PE protocol relies on 
commutative cryptography, thus some background for this is provided first. 
 
2.2.1 Commutative Cryptosystems 
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Many cryptographic applications employ sequential encryption and decryption 
operations under one or more underlying cryptosystems. The reasons to 
sequence (cascade) different cryptographic schemes together include 
strengthening the resulting ciphertext and achieving additional functionality 
which is impossible under any given encryption scheme on its own (Shannon, 
1949; Weis, 2006). A basic cascadable cryptosystem can consist of a number 
of encryption stages, where the output from one stage is treated as an input to 
another. In such a basic cascadable cryptosystem it is necessary to decrypt in 
the reverse order of encryption operations. However, a special class of 
sequential cryptosystems - commutative cryptosystems – allows for the 
decryption of a ciphertext in an arbitrary order. Thus, a ciphertext )(meec ab  (c 
– ciphertext, m – plaintext, e – encryption operation under keys a and b), 
could be decrypted as either )(cddm ab  or as )(cddm ba . The advantages of 
such cryptosystems were widely promoted by Shamir (1980) as used in his, 
Rivest’s and Aldman’s classic game of mental poker, employing the Three-
Pass (3Pass) secret exchange protocol.  
 
The most commonly used commutative cryptosystem is based on the Pohlig-
Hellman (PH), asymmetric private key scheme (1978). This scheme first 
published in 1978 has never become popular since it is asymmetric, and 
therefore slow in comparison to other private key systems. While the PH 
protocol influenced the design of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key 
scheme (1978), the main strength of PH is that it is commutative for keys 
based on the same prime number and that it allows for comparing the 
encrypted ciphertexts. Consequently, under PH the two ciphertext  )(meec abba   
and )(meec baab   hiding the same plaintext m are equal (1), while this is not the 
case with ordinary encryption protocols, that satisfy (2). 
 
)()( meemee abba   (1) 
)()( meemee abba   (2) 
 
Thanks to those properties PH can be used in the 3Pass primitive that allows 
two parties to exchange data without exchange of keys, as well as to perform 
PEqT that permits private matching of data records. 
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2.2.2 Three Pass Protocol (3Pass) 
The 3Pass protocol, shown in Fig.1, was intended to allow two parties to 
share a secret without exchanging any private or public key.  
 
 
Alice Bob 
m  )(mEA  
))(( mEE AB  
)(mEA  
)()))((( mEmEED BABA   )(mEB  
mmED BB ))((  
1 
2 
3 
4 
Alice’s input: secret message m ; encryption key AE  ; decryption key AD . 
Bob’s input: encryption key BE ; decryption key BD . 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Three-Pass Secret Exchange Protocol. 
The protocol was aimed at providing an alternative to public-key encryption and DH-like key negotiation protocols. 
 
The operation of the protocol can be described using the following physical 
analogy: 
 
1. Alice places a secret message m in a box and locks it with a padlock 
AE . 
2. The box is sent to Bob, who adds his padlock BE  to the latch, and 
sends the box back. 
3. Alice removes her padlock and passes the box back to Bob. 
4. Bob removes his padlock, and this enables him to read the message 
from inside the box. 
 
There could be more parties, or encryption stages, involved in a 3Pass-like 
protocol, and this property makes it ideal for locking a plaintext multiple times 
and then unlocking it in an arbitrary order, as long as the parties are 
cooperating until the execution of the protocol is completed. Such functionality 
is required by IDAP as described later in this paper. 
 
2.3 Private Equality Test (PEqT) 
PEqT protocols can be used to privately verify whether two secret inputs to 
the protocol are equal or not. Agrawal, Evfimievski and Srikant (2003) 
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proposed one of the most scalable and flexible PEqT protocols for operations 
on datasets. The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be described in the 
following steps: 
 
1. Alice encrypts her input and sends it to Bob. 
2. Bob encrypts the ciphertext received from Alice and sends it back. 
3. Bob encrypts his secret input and sends it to Alice. 
4. Alice encrypts the ciphertext containing Bob’s input. 
5. Alice compares the two resulting ciphertexts, if they are equal then her 
and Bob’s inputs are equal. 
6. Alice may inform Bob about the result. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Private Equality Test. 
This protocol allows two parties to compare their secret inputs. 
 
The following section describes a scheme that extends both the PEqT and 
3Pass primitives to form the PE protocol that is the blueprint for our  IDAP.  
 
2.4 Private Equijoin Protocol 
A PE protocol can enable two parties, the chooser and the sender, to privately 
compare their sets of unique values VC and VS, and allows the chooser to 
retrieve some extra information )(vext  about records VS, that match records VC 
on a given parameter. Thus, sensitive data marked as VC and VS, such as 
date of birth, address or credit-card number, describing the data subjects in 
two datasets can be compared in their encrypted forms using the PEqT 
primitive, in order to find the equijoin between the two datasets. The equijoin 
shows where the list of the items requested match the lists of the items in the 
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dataset and nothing else. Then the PE uses the 3Pass primitive to reveal the 
information that the sender wants to make available to the chooser, the )(vext , 
for the items in equijoin only. However, the sender is “blind” at this stage, as 
s/he does not know the records that are in the equijoin. Consequently, the 
investigators could encrypt their list of the suspects VC and receive data, )(vext  
on the individuals matching the criteria in the encrypted set VS. Please note 
that v  stands for a single record/data-subject in dataset CV  or SV . Thus the 
uppercase letters refer to sets. The PE protocol involves the following steps: 
 
1. Both parties apply hash function h to the elements in their sets, so that 
)( CC VhX   and )( SS VhX  . Chooser picks a secret PH key CE  at random, 
and sender picks two PH keys SE  and SE , all from the same group 
*
p . 
2. Chooser encrypts entries in the set: ))(()( CCCCC VhEXEY  . 
3. Chooser sends to sender set CY , reordered lexicographically. 
4. Sender encrypts each entry CYy , received from the chooser, with both 
SE  and SE  and for each returns 3-tuple )(),(, yEyEy SS  . 
5. For each SXvh )( , sender does the following: 
(a) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  for use in equality test. 
(b) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  for use as a key to lock the extra information 
about v, ))(()( vhEv S . 
(c) Encrypts the extra information )(vext : 
))(),(()( vextvKvc   
Where K is a symmetric encryption function and )(v  is the key 
crafted in Stage 5b. 
(d) Forms a pair )()),(( vcvhES . These pairs, containing a private match 
element and the encrypted extra information about record v, are 
then transferred to chooser. 
6. Chooser removes her encryption CE  from all entries in the 3-tuples 
received in Step 4 obtaining tuples α, β, and γ such that 
))(()),((),(,, vhEvhEvh SS  . Thus, α is the hashed value CVv , β is the 
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hashed value v encrypted using SE , and γ is the hashed value v 
encrypted using SE . 
7.  Chooser sets aside all pairs received in Step 5, whose first entry is 
equal to one of the β tuples obtained in Step 6. Then using the γ tuples 
as symmetric keys it decrypts the extra information contained in the 
second entry in the pair )()),(( vcvhES . 
 
The above protocol can perform the basic functions required for the purpose 
of investigative data acquisition. Its use in investigative scenarios is described 
in the following section. 
 
3 . IDAP VS. PRIVATE EQUIJOIN 
This section evaluates our proposed use of the PE protocol as basis for IDAP. 
The operations required during investigative data acquisition from a third party 
in general consist of: 
 
1. Identification of the type of the information that is required. These could 
be h parameters that contain answers to investigator’s questions, 
referred to as return parameters rp1-k, e.g. Date of Birth (DOB), 
address, location of a card payment, or numbers called by a given 
subscriber. In a formal, legally prescribed environment, it ought to be 
able to demonstrate later that these criteria matched those on the 
warrant application, adding an additional level of legal scrutiny and 
accountability.  
2. Specification of any circumstantial request constrains, or l different 
input parameters, ip1-l, with values ip_val1-l, e.g. time frame of the 
transactions being requested. 
3. Specification of the relevant data subject e.g. by identifying the 
individual whose data is to be retrieved, or by providing the mobile 
phone number of the suspect, etc. This parameter is referred to as the 
record of the interest, ri with value ri_val. 
4. Retrieval of the relevant records. 
 
18 
 
Then, if we refer to the dataset as the source, the request for investigative 
data could be mapped into the following SQL query: 
 
SELECT rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source             (2) 
WHERE ri=ri_val AND ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl= ip_val l 
 
In most cases the names of the return parameters, as well as the names of 
the input parameters, and values of these input parameters can be openly 
communicated. But the value of the interesting record, ri_val is used to 
uniquely identify the suspect and must be hidden. This can be achieved by 
running a database query for the return parameters of all the records that 
satisfy the conditions defined by the input parameters and then collecting the 
interesting record from the sender using a PE protocol. Consequently, the 
query that is actually run on the sender’s database can be rewritten to: 
 
SELECT ri, rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source             (3) 
WHERE ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl= ip_val l 
 
The results of such query (3) would be an input to a PE that would enable the 
chooser to privately select only the record of interest that match given ri_val.  
  
3.1 PE’s Performance 
The previous section discussed different types of protocols available that 
could enable the chooser to download a record from the sender’s database, 
maintaining the secrecy of the record selected. We also mentioned that most 
available protocols could not achieve IDAP on their own, and a combination of 
two or more protocols is required. Such combination typically results in high 
computational and communicational complexity, because each protocol 
usually requires its own preparation phase. The PE protocol described in 
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Section IV is capable of both private matching and performing SPIR, and has 
a low overhead. Table I defines the computational complexity of the protocol.3 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
Computational Complexity of the PE protocol 
 
Symmetric 
Crypto. 
Asymmetric 
Crypto. 
crypto. 
operation 
key 
generation 
crypto. 
operation 
Step 1 - )3(O  - 
Step 2 - - )(mO  
Step 4 - - )2( mO  
Step 5 )(nO  - )2( nO  
Step 6 - - )2( mO  
Step 7 )(mO  - - 
Total Complexity )( mnO   )3(O  )25( nmO   
Cost (ms/operation) 0.33 7 30 
The complexity of each of the steps in the proposed initial solution. 
Where n is the number of the data rows in the source, and m is the 
number of interesting records. Cost is the measured average time in ms 
to perform given cryptographic operation from managed C# .NET code. 
 
 
In practice this particular solution based on the PH cipher and implemented in 
C# .NET can process thousand records a minute, on average. The following 
                                               
3 For the research purposes the PE protocol has been implemented on a desktop computer 
running Microsoft Windows XP Professional operating system with an AMD Turion 64 X2 
Mobile 1.58GHz CPU, and 3GB of RAM. The implementation was based on the Bouncy 
Castle cryptographic API. MS SQL GUIDs acted as input to hashing protocols, while the 
produced hashes were used as an input to the asymmetric algorithms (as in the OT and PE 
protocols). The AES128 protocol was tested using a 1kB input (that is approx. 150 words of 
ASCII text) this is expected to be larger than necessary to simulate records returned by the 
dataholder (similar amounts of data are used in Iliev and S. W. Smith (2005) and Cristofaro et 
al 2009. Using the implementation the research team has confirmed that some of the 
experiments can be simulated based on the computational complexity and cost measured in 
millisecond for operation. The values for the cost presented in Table I are based on an 
average time for the execution of 1 million cryptographic operations of the given type. 
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section discusses the performance in context of investigation, and discusses 
issues that could possibly limit the usability of the solution presented. 
 
3.2 Advantages of PE in data acquisition process 
Following our general philosophy outlined in the first part, the PE protocol 
allows for acquiring more than one interesting record at the time, and adding 
more records to the enquiry increases the processing time by a negligible 
value (~151ms) per each extra interesting record in an enquiry. Use of the PE 
would also satisfy the condition that the dataholder remains in full control of 
data, and decides which data can be disclosed. This addresses several 
current legal concerns regarding whether or not the police should be given 
direct access to traffic data in particular, or, as in the present system, the data  
controller should remain in control of the data and can if necessary refuse the 
request and challenge its legitimacy in court.  In the PE protocol each record 
is processed separately and there are no chances of the records being mixed 
up by the privacy-preserving process. Thanks to this fact unnecessary data of 
non-suspects could be discarded on reception by the authorities and still the 
encrypted interesting records received would form valid evidence for use in a 
court of law. The costs involved in building and deploying PE based IDAP are 
anticipated to be low since it is a software system and the architecture is 
based on a protocol that is in the public domain.   
   
 
3.3 Limitations of PE in the data acquisition process 
The processing time required for the protocol to run is the main drawback of 
the PE protocol. If there are a thousand records in the database it only takes 
approximately one minute for the complete run of the protocol, however, the 
processing time is linear to the number of records in a dataset and data 
acquisition from a database with five million records would take three and a 
half days to run on an ordinary PC. During an urgent enquiry, especially 
where there is a clear danger to life, the police can currently get access to 
relevant location data from a mobile network operator in less than half an 
hour. Such a result could not be expected of PE if the database has more 
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than thirty thousand records. Additionally, even if the data requested is 
relatively small in size, e.g. 100kB per record, the results from a database of 
five million records would be more thank 500MB of data that would need to be 
transferred over the Internet. Clearly, there is a requirement for the PE to run 
on a subset of the sender’s database rather than the whole database or 
another solution would need to be chosen. The first approach is described 
further below. 
  
The more serious problem is that PE alone does not solve the issues that we 
discussed in the introduction.  A PE based system would work reasonable 
well in those situations where the issue is merely the secure matching of a 
single value per record, e.g. an IP address, name or a credit card number. In 
some scenarios it may however be necessary to request records based on a 
number of secret input parameters. Consider a scenario where the police has 
a profile of a suspect based on a complex investigative hypothesis about a 
planned terrorist attack, for instance the simultaneous kidnapping of key 
politicians and other high profile targets. This investigative hypothesis 
provides the investigators with a number of search parameters even if they do 
not yet have a specific theory about any individual in the terrorist group. This 
could be for instance people who showed a particular interest in the diaries of 
possible targets, provided that they don’t have a profile that makes such an 
interest plausible. When matching now  this profile against people working in 
certain organizations, information about this investigative hypothesis  could be 
deduced by  those organisation, which  may harm both  the investigation and 
also entire groups of people that  match the profile.. For example if the case 
being investigated has the potential to create public tension, disclosing 
through the search parameters  that  the suspect’s profile matched individuals 
in a local minority could  have serious consequences to the members of this 
minority if it is leaked the press that the police interests are going in that 
direction. Alternatively, the data holder may learn more about current thinking 
of the police on how to make effective bombs, or who the police thinks 
possible targets could be.  IDAP should be able to assist the police in such a 
scenario by hiding the search parameters form the data holder, thus some 
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modifications needs to be introduced to the protocol, which are proposed in 
the next section. 
  
 
4. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 
The previous section has listed the drawbacks of using PE in the pursuit of 
IDAP. Here these drawbacks are addressed by two correcting measures that 
modify the PE protocol for the specific purpose of investigative data 
acquisition. 
 
4.1  Lowering Processing Time 
Above we recommended minimising the processing time required for each run 
of the protocol in large databases, such as those belonging to ISPs and 
mobile telephone providers. Theoretically, in order to maintain privacy of the 
suspect, the chooser needs to request from the sender to process all the 
records in the database. Only this way no information about the interesting 
records is revealed. The correctness of this scheme can be proven under the 
requirements of the multiparty computation (Asonov & Freytag, 2003). In its 
current form the system would not be capable of processing any urgent 
requests due to the processing time required, and this would be a major 
drawback. This could be mitigated by limiting the numbers of records that 
need to be processed and then sent by the sender per enquiry. Privacy of the 
alleged suspect should be protected, but if the probability of the sender 
guessing the ID of the interesting record is for example 1:1000 and not 1:n, 
and the dataholder has no other information that could help infer any 
knowledge as to the identity of the suspect, then this research argues that the 
privacy of the suspect and the investigation  is maintained. As we discussed 
above, also during traditional face-to-face investigations, diffusion is used - 
hiding the suspect’s identity by asking open-ended questions about a larger 
group of individuals rather than about a single person. As we noted, this is a 
widely accepted technique which would however in a digitalised environment 
fall foul of the prohibition of fishing expeditions. We are therefore from a legal 
perspective required to balance various conflicting – and sometimes 
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converging - interests. The interests of the police in a speedy investigation 
converge with those of other data subjects that he police should only receive 
the minimal amount of data necessary – this point to a solution that limits the 
number of “camouflage records” that they receive.  From the perceptive of the 
suspect, it matters just how detrimental an inference would be drawn by the 
mere fact of being the suspect of a criminal investigation. Thirdly, the nature 
of the data is also relevant. In an investigation against a suspected 
paedophile for instance, even otherwise innocent behaviour like browsing 
catalogues for children wear can be indirect evidence for the police case. In 
this situation, were it to become public knowledge that someone is suspected 
by the police of paedophilia would be particularly severe on an innocent 
suspect. At the same time, the mere fact that someone was looking at clothing 
catalogues is not particularly sensitive data outside the context of such an 
investigation; after all, even Amazon’s recommender system will make use of 
it. Therefore, the customers of the online retailer who are asked to provide 
“camouflage” for our suspect do not risk anything personally, even if the data 
were compromised, as the fact that they too looked at clothing catalogues is 
in itself uninteresting. In this scenario, it seems reasonable to increase the 
number of foils, as the risk for each is negligible, but the privacy gain for the 
suspect considerable. However, if the data is sensitive or possibly 
embarrassing regardless of whether or not it is analysed in the context of an 
investigation, for instance information about buying Viagra, then the number 
of foils should be reduced to minimise the risk for them as third parties. In 
both situations, another parameter would be the speed with which the police 
needs the information. Our approach allows to “scale” the protection of both 
the suspect and that of the other customers, taking this type of legally 
required balancing as a starting point.   
    
The problem is to decide on the technique of narrowing down the scope in a 
way that ensures the record of interest are among the results returned. If the 
list of the record identifiers is public, such as the list of the Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses or telephone numbers served by a given network operator, 
then the chooser could simply selected records to be processed at random 
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from such directory. However, in case such list is not publicly available it 
would be possible to split the PE protocol back into separate parts: PEqT; and 
OT, and an additional off-line preparation phase. This way the initial off-line 
phase could be run against the whole database, but the information retrieval 
would be performed against a smaller set of records. If as a number of 
records requested per each interesting record is defined as the diluting factor 
- o the protocol IDAP would be defined as follows: 
 
Phase A - Preparation 
1.  Sender applies hash function h to the elements in the input set VS, so 
that )( SS VhX  .  
2. Sender picks a encryption PH key SE  at random from a group 
*
p , 
where p is a strong prime. 
3. Sender encrypts each SXvh )(  with the key SE , the result is a list of 
encrypted identities ))(()( SSSSS VhEXEY   
If more records need to be added to the set these can be processes using 
steps 1 and 3, and then added to the list. 
 
Phase B - PEqT 
1. Following a request for data, sender provides chooser with a complete 
list of encrypted identities prepared during Phase A, reordered 
lexicographically. 
2. Chooser applies hash function h to the elements in set containing the 
identities of the interesting records, so that )( CC VhX  .  
3. Chooser picks a commutative cryptography key pair, encryption key CE  
and decryption key CD , at random from the same group 
*
p  that was 
used by sender in the Phase A. 
4. Chooser encrypts entries in the set XC, so that: ))(()( CCCCC VhEXEY  . 
5. Chooser sends to sender set CY , reordered lexicographically. 
6. Sender encrypts with key SE  each entry CYy  received from chooser. 
7. Sender returns set of pairs )(, yEy S  to chooser. 
8. Chooser decrypts each entry in )( CS YE , obtaining  
)())(()( CSCCCSCCS YEDXEEDXE  .  
9. Chooser compares each entry in )( CS XE  to the entries of SY  
constructed in Step A3 (Step 3 of Phase A) and received by the 
chooser inStep B1 . This way the interesting records can be identified. 
 
Phase C - OT 
1. After identifying the interesting records in SY  the chooser selects at 
random 1o  other unique records from SY  for each interesting record in 
CV . These are the diluting records, that together with the records of 
interest form a shortlist for the enquiry . If the number of interesting 
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records multiplied by o is greater than n, the size of the dataset VS, 
then the complete SY  is shortlisted.  
2. Send the shortlist to sender. 
3. Sender picks an encryption PH key SE  at random from the group 
*
p . 
4. Sender identifies entries )(vh  from SX  that have been shortlisted and 
processes each shortlisted record in the following way: 
(a) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  to form the key used to lock the extra 
information about v, i.e. )(vext , ))(()( vhEv S . 
(b) Encrypts the extra information using a symmetric encryption 
function K and the key )(v  crafted in the previous step: 
))(),(()( vextvKvc   
(c) Forms a pair )()),(( vcvhES .  
5. The pairs formed in C4(c), containing a private match element and the 
encrypted extra information about record v, are then transferred to 
chooser. 
6. Sender encrypts each entry CYy , received from chooser in Step B5, 
with key SE  to form set of pairs )(, yEy S  
7. Pairs )(, yEy S  are then transferred to chooser. 
8. Chooser removes the encryption CE  from all entries in the 2-tuples 
received in Step C7 obtaining tuples α, β such that ))((),(, vhEvh S . 
Thus, α is the hashed value CVv , and β is the hashed value v 
encrypted using SE . 
9.  Chooser sets aside all pairs received in Step C5, whose first entry is 
equal to one of the first entry of any two-tuples obtained in Step B9. 
Then uses the appropriate β tuple associated with a given interesting 
record as a symmetric key to decrypt the extra information contained in 
the second entry in the pair received in C5. This is performed for all the 
matching entries. 
 
In this improved protocol the initial processing depends on the size of the 
dataset - n, but it needs to be performed only once in a given period of time, 
e.g. once per month, or per year. There is no need that the camouflage data 
is up to date, since the police is ex hypothesis investigating a past event, so 
might well be interested in a former client, or a client whose circumstances 
have changed. The remaining operations are less processing savvy as 
illustrated in Table II. The IDAP protocol has been implemented in the same 
fashion as the PE protocol described in Section 3.1. The results from the 
empirical evaluation matched the results that simulated using the 
computational complexity and cost presented in Table II. 
 
TABLE II 
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Computational Complexity of Improvement 1 
 Symmetric 
Crypto. 
Asymmetric Crypto 
crypto. 
operation 
key 
generation 
crypto. 
operation 
Phase A 
(run periodically) 
Step 1 - - - 
Step 2 - )1(O  - 
Step 3 - - )(nO  
Phase B 
(run per enquiry) 
Step 3 - )1(O  - 
Step 4 - - )(mO  
Step 6 - - )(mO  
Step 8  - )(mO  
Phase C 
(run per enquiry) 
Step 3 - )1(O  - 
Step 4(a) - - )( omO   
Step 4(b) )( omO   - - 
Step 6 - - )(mO  
Step 8 - - )(mO  
Step 9 )(mO  - - 
Total Complexity for k enquiries, where omn   ))1(( okmO  )12( kO  ))5(( nokmO   
Cost (ms/operation) 0.33 7 30 
The complexity of each of the steps in the proposed improved solution. Where n is the number of the data 
rows in the source, m is the number of interesting records. Also the diluting factor o, as well as the number of 
the protocol runs k affect the processing time required by the protocol. Cost is the measured average time in 
ms to perform given cryptographic operation from managed C# .NET code. 
 
Fig. 3 illustrates the processes involved in this improved version of acquisition 
protocol. It is worth noting that there are  only five communication rounds 
required in this protocol. This is two rounds more than in the original PE 
protocol, still, most of efficient SPIR protocols require considerably more 
rounds. This method provides significant improvements to the processing time 
required for enquiries if total number of records in the sender’s database is 
higher than mo , i.e. higher than the number of interesting records m 
multiplied by the diluting factor o. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. Furthermore, the 
true strength of this version of the protocol is seen when multiple enquiries are 
run of the same database using a single encrypted catalogue of the records, 
compiled by the sender in Phase 1 (shown in Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 3 IDAP Process Flow 
Graphical representation of the improved IDAP 
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Fig. 4 Processing time per enquiry depending on the number of interesting records 
This proposed modification of the protocol improves significantly the processing time required for the 
protocol to run for the cases where the product of the number of the interesting records m and diluting 
factor o is smaller that the number of the records in the database n. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Processing time depending on the number of enquires 
This proposed modification improves significantly the processing time required for the protocol to run for the 
cases where more than one enquiry is run against the same database. 
 
 
4.2  Allow multiple selection criteria 
The PE protocol can be used to privately retrieve data if the data is identified 
by a single parameter, such as ID number, credit card number, IP address, 
etc. However, this is not always the case. Consequently, if IDAP is used to 
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find a suspect based on circumstantial knowledge, or a suspect’s profile, the 
PE protocol needs to be modified. Query (4) shows the way the request (3) 
would be modified for such enquiry, here sip1-j stand for j secret input 
parameters: 
 
SELECT sip1, sip2, …, sipj, rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source (4)  
WHERE ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl=ip_vall 
 
A computationally expensive solution to this problem has been published by 
Kwecka, Buchanan, and Spiers (2010). The authors suggest that symmetric 
encryption should be used to lock the return parameters and the symmetric 
keys should be secured with relevant commutative encryption keys that are 
unique to each value of the secret input parameter returned for the given row. 
Despite being computationally expensive, this solution has a unique benefit of 
allowing semi-fuzzy matching of the results if the underlying commutative 
protocol is ElGamal-based. In this paper a simplified approach is proposed. 
Since the query (4) replaces the ri parameter with j different sip parameters, 
the list of these j parameters could be used as a complex ri in the improved 
IDAP protocol. Thus, in Steps B2 and A1 a list of all values of given sip 
parameters would be hashed together to form records in sets VC and VS. This 
way the security of the protocol nor its complexity is affected by this 
improvement.  
 
4.3  Correctness and Security 
IDAP is a modification of the PE protocol that has its correctness and security proofs 
provided in Agrawal Evfimievski, and. Srikant (2003). The goals and logic of 
IDAP and PE are similar; however, IDAP is streamlined to provide better 
performance than PE in the specific use scenario of investigative data 
acquisition. There is an assumption that there is a method of authenticating 
other parties and securing the channel for communication. In order to 
evaluate the correctness and security of IDAP the inputs and outputs need to 
be clearly stated (Cristofaro et al 2009)]: 
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Chooser’s input: set  containing IDs of interesting records. 
Sender’s input: set  containing IDs of the records in the dataset, together with 
extra information about these records – . 
Output: chooser learns , , and  for 
, while . Proxy learns only the sizes of 
the sets.  
Normally both parties learn the sizes  and , as by default all the 
encrypted identities in  are send to the chooser, while the chooser in order 
to find the interesting records among these encrypted identities and in order to 
decrypt the  for these records provides the sender with encrypted 
elements of the set . There is no requirement by the public authorities to 
know the size of the dataset, but since there is now a way to run IDAP and 
avoid providing the authorities with the dataset size, this needs to be accepted 
as an outcome of the protocol. The fact that the sender learns the number of 
interesting records is beneficial in the data acquisition scenario, as the sender 
can then verify that the chooser follows the data acquisition notice that would 
previously outline the IDs of the interesting records, and under IDAP would 
specify the number of the interesting records.  
IDAP is based on Shamir’s commutative protocols, a variant of PH protocol 
where the prime p is public and common between the communicating parties. 
An adversary with the knowledge of the ciphertext C and the prime p would 
need to solve the following hard problem to break the commutative PH 
protocol (Schneier 1995): 
  mod   
 
Just like RSA, the ciphertext created using the PH algorithm may leak some 
information about the input plaintext message. Therefore, this algorithm is 
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suitable for uses where the input is formed from random data. This is the case 
in the PE and IDAP, as the commutative PH is used to encrypt hashed IDs of 
the records. While it is normally recommended to use padding schemes in 
any implementation of RSA (Kaliski 2003), and thus PH implementation as 
well, the PE and IDAP mitigate this requirement by using fixed size hashes as 
the input.  
The proofs of the correctness and security of PE can be found in . Agrawal, A. 
Evfimievski, and R. Srikant (2003), while IDAP has modified this protocol by 
introducing the following improvements: 
 Lowering processing time, by narrowing the scope of the enquiry. 
 Allowing for multiple selection criteria.  
 Restoring the balance between the privacy of the innocent and the suspects. 
In order to narrow down the scope of the enquiry IDAP splits the PE protocol 
into three parts. However, the only way the operations of the protocol are 
affected is the fact that under IDAP the chooser request extra information for 
only  records, rather than for the whole dataset n. The main 
consequence of this approach in respect to the security of the protocol is that 
the sender knows that there are m interesting suspects in the set of identities 
the size of . This could become an issue if the same request is run 
against a number of parties and the parties collude, but this thesis has shown 
that the investigative data acquisition process can be treated as a single 
database scenario, if requests are made against CSPs. Therefore colluding is 
not possible. On the other hand, for small organisations with less than 
100,000 IDs, there is no need to narrow down the results. Consequently, in 
IDAP, the privacy of the suspect is affected by the diluting factor o, and the 
sender’s probability of guessing the interesting records IDs is 1:o and not 1:n. 
As long as o is reasonably large, and the sender has no other sources of 
information about the suspects, the privacy of the suspects should be safe.  
IDAP allows for the multiple selection criteria by hashing together different 
selection criteria and using it within the PE protocol as an ID of a record. This 
32 
 
does not affect the security of the PE protocol. On the other hand adding a 
semi-trusted third party – the proxy – in order to restore the balance between 
the privacy of the innocents and the suspects that we will discuss in the next 
section would somewhat modify the security of the protocol. The proxy filters 
out the records not classified as interesting from the sender’s response. 
Assuming that the semi-trusted party behaves as expected, the security of the 
, the data records contained in the sender’s database is information 
theoretic from the chooser’s perspective. On the other hand, if the proxy and 
the sender cooperate, they can easily work out the identities of the interesting 
records. The main aim of IDAP is to hide those identities from the sender, 
However, under current practice, the identities of the suspects are provided in 
every data acquisition notice. Consequently, if the semi-trusted party were to 
cooperate with the sender, this would only reveal information that is currently 
openly communicated to the dataholders anyway, making the worst case 
scenario not worse than current best practice.  
4.4  Communicational Complexity 
 
The cost of communications should also be considered when discussing 
IDAP. This cost depends on the diluting factor, just as the cost of processing 
does. Thus, for low values of o, such as 1,000, the cost of communications 
should be reasonable. However, where higher degree of privacy and secrecy 
is required, the costs of on-line communications could prove to be prohibitive. 
In such cases, it would be possible to exchange encrypted data via the post or 
couriers, as there are a small number of communication rounds between the 
parties. 
 
5.  Assessing privacy risks and Data Protection Directive compliance  
 
 
In this final section we return to our discussion from the beginning and 
evaluate the wider legal and societal issues that this proposal raises and 
assess the privacy risks that are involved. We recommend in response two 
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institutional aspects to complement the technological solutions described 
above. 
 
Let us recap quickly the main features of the system that we have described 
so far. The police is interested in our target, John Doe. They make a request 
for data about Doe to the online provider X. Since X does not need to know 
the identity of the suspect, and may draw adverse inferences about him if he 
knew that the customer was target of an investigation, the police requests 
data from a larger set of people (the foils), chosen randomly. Since the retailer 
knows that only one of the people whose information he hands over is the 
suspect, he can’t any longer draw an adverse inference against any 
individual; the community hides the identity of the suspect from the retailer 
behind a wall build by them all, just as in the Spartacus example. At the same 
time, the data of all the customers is encrypted in such a way that the police 
can only make sense of the data that belongs to the suspect – a key has been 
created prior to making the data request that opens only that data for the 
specific subject under investigation. The encryption renders the records 
unusable to the authorities in the sense that they are secure against attacks in 
polynomial time. This prevents “fishing expeditions”, and ensures that the data 
of the innocent customers can’t be used by the police for other purposes.  
However, this still involves providing government agencies with records of 
individuals that are “innocent bystanders”, which raises legal issues as well as 
issues of public acceptance. There are some additional actions that may 
reassure the public that the data is safe. First, if the technique for minimising 
the processing time (Improvement 1) is employed, the chances that 
investigators will retrieve encrypted records of a particular individual that is not 
a suspect are small in large datasets. Thus, for a dataset with n records, 
during investigation with m interesting records and the diluting factor o the 
probability of this event A can be defined as (5) 
 
(5)
mn
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
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Consequently for investigations with five interesting records, with diluting 
factor of a thousand and a dataset consisting a million records, the probability 
of this event occurring during a single run of the protocol would be less than 
0.5%. Since the runs of the protocol are independent this probability would 
stay the same. This also means that the investigators would need to first 
break the encryption key used by the sender to hide identities (Phase A), 
before they could attempt to obtain the data about a specific individual that is 
not a suspect, otherwise the probability of the encrypted data being provided 
to them would be small. Additionally, if the identity of a data subject is never 
encrypted under the same key as the data records, then investigators would 
need to successfully brute force two separate keys in order to make use of the 
retrieved encrypted records. Otherwise the information would be unintelligible. 
 The chosen encryption method makes it all but impossible for the police to 
get access to the data of the “foils”. Even if they could access this data, it 
would in all likelihood be is of no interest to anyone, and have no potential of 
privacy harm, as was generated randomly. In addition to the relevant 
information that Doe bought large quantities of fertiliser – relevant giving the 
investigative hypothesis that he is a bomb maker – the police would learn 
nothing more significant than e.g. that  a Mr. Smith bought a shovel and Mrs 
Jones a wheelbarrow from the same farm equipment company. At the same 
time, the police would become exposed to a significant risk themselves for 
violating their legal obligation to destroy this data unseen. This random 
character of the camouflage information therefore prevents the police from 
using this data strategically. However, some of the data could expose the data 
subject to risks other than privacy risks. If for instance the data from the ”foils” 
happens to be credit card details, and the police were to lose this data before 
destruction, people may fear that they have been exposed to an unacceptable 
risk that the data can fall into the hand of criminals. That the data is highly 
encrypted may be insufficient to alleviate this fear. Acceptability therefore 
depends also on the public trust into the data handling and security 
procedures used by the police institutionally, not just the technology provided 
by our approach. Most security professionals trust into a security process 
more than they trust in encryption. The solution proposed here is that in order 
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to reassure the public, a semi-trusted third party needs to be involved and 
integrated into the protocol. The following modifications to the IDAP are 
proposed: 
 
1. All communication between chooser and sender goes through proxy. 
2. Chooser provides proxy with the identifiers of the interesting records 
encrypted by sender, ))(( vhES . This is done over a secure channel or 
with use of a 3Pass protocol once the parties are authenticated. 
3.  At the stage where data is transferred from sender in Step C4, proxy 
filters the response and discards the records that were not specified by 
chooser’s request, i.e. the records other than the ones identified in 
Step 2. 
 
The semi-trusted party should have no interest in finding out the object of the 
investigation or the content of the data records returned by the dataholder. 
The party that is chosen must not cooperate with the sender or the protocol 
will be broken, since simple matching exercise would reveal the identities of 
the suspects. A key concept is that the proxy has no incentives to find out the 
detail of the investigation, thus it is not going to invest in expensive cutting -
edge decryption technology to decode the data, nor it is going to cooperate 
with the sender in order to establish the identity of the suspect. On the other 
hand, if the need arises to verify the chooser’s requests in front of a court of 
law, the proxy and the sender could work together to establish the identities of 
the records requested by the chooser, or verify that the data request by the 
police was in conformance with the warrant that was granted. This introduces 
an additional “price” for the police – in return for more secrecy vis a vis the 
data controller (the online retailer or bank) and a more efficient search, they 
are also subject to more scrutiny and transparency, as data requests are now 
necessarily lodged with a third party, that can also check if the formulation of 
the search query was law compliant. Since under current law, any camouflage 
data would have to be destroyed immediately after the data of the suspect is 
transferred to the police (as storage after this point would be unnecessary, in 
violation of the data minimisation principle), the problem that the police might 
36 
 
be tempted to “store” the excess data until such a time that decryption 
technology has improved is addressed.  
 
Nonetheless, from a legal perspective even encrypted data is still personal 
data under the Data Protection Directive, even though the UK implementation 
of this European Directive is less clear on this point. This means one of the six 
legally valid grounds for processing the data must hold. The most obvious one 
is the consent of the data subjects, and we will come back to this option 
below. Another basis can be a legal duty created through statute.4 Currently, 
no such duty to shield each other exists in any EU member state. However, 
the arguments that we developed in the first part of this paper would at least 
permit legislators to create such a duty. Even though it would impose a 
(minimal) privacy risk for the “foils”, since this is required to reduce the much 
greater privacy risk of the suspect, we argue that such a prima facie 
infringement would be proportionate, efficient and necessary. Finally, using 
again the notion from the beginning of this paper that  privacy is as a common  
good that is fundamental for a free, democratic order, it may even be possible 
to permit such an approach even in the absence of new legal duties. Art 7(e) 
of the directive creates a blanket exception if the processing of the data 
“necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest” 
This in turn might make it unnecessary to require consent from those 
customers whose data is used merely to hide the identity of the suspect. Just 
as our privacy can be violated as part of a criminal investigation to further the 
public good of efficient law enforcement, so one could argue that we are also 
required to shoulder a purely abstract privacy risk to maintain the foundations 
of a democratic. Similar arguments have been made in the past regarding 
medical research data and “benefit sharing”: as long as I benefit in the long 
run from medical research, solidarity requires that I take a marginal privacy 
risk in making some of my data, in an anonymised, encrypted format, 
available for research (Wicks et all 2010, Laurie and Sethi 2013)). We have a 
similar benefit sharing here – everybody can become subject of a police 
investigation, so in the long run, I share the benefits from a system that pools 
                                               
4 Data Protection Directive Art 7(c) 
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all our records and selects randomly a few of them each time a the modern 
equivalent of a Roman General asks is: Which one of you is Spartacus? 
 
Basing the approach on Art 7(c) or 7(e) respectively would result in slightly 
different legal regimes, and therefore also slightly different implementations of 
the approach. In neither case, consent of the foils” is necessary. However, if 
governments were to decide to impose a new duty under Art 7(c), the 
approach proposed in this paper, or a functionally equivalent solution, would 
become legally mandatory and therefore used by all online organisations that 
store customer data. Art 7(e) by contrast simply creates a permission for 
online retailers to implement this solution of they consider it beneficial for 
them, and we would expect a much less widespread uptake, with market 
forces ultimately deciding on its acceptance.  
 
However, the absence of case law makes it difficult to assess if this argument,  
which rests exclusively on the strength of the jurisprudential analysis of 
privacy outlined in the first part of this paper,  would withstand scrutiny by the 
courts. A legally safer option is therefore to ask for a generic consent from 
customers – “are you willing to put your data in a pool if and when there are 
police inquiries in the future”? This anticipatory consent prevents time delays 
during investigations. Whether or not a sufficient number of customers would 
be willing to subscribe to such a scheme requires further, empirical research 
that should also address the question how adequate incentives could be 
designed. We noticed above the possible conflict between a conception of 
privacy as a public good and the notion of consent as the ultimate “trump” that 
can lead to individuals opting out of their legally guaranteed protection. Prima 
facie, the situation is different here. While enlightened self – interest is one 
reason people may have for allowing their data to be used as camouflage in 
an investigation, the aim ultimately is to protect a common good. However, if 
solidarity alone is not sufficient to incentivise customer’s to protect in a mutual 
privacy protection scheme, other incentives could be found. One possibility 
would be to require reciprocity in order to be protected under the scheme – 
38 
 
only those who “donate” their data will benefit if they themselves should come 
under the spotlight.   
 
However, it is at least questionable if this approach would be legally sound – 
after all, if the police makes an inquiry regarding someone who is not 
participant in the scheme, his data would be treated with less concern for 
privacy than possible in principle, which would arguably mean that the data 
controller, that is the company, is in violation of data protection law. This again 
reflects that ultimately privacy would be treated in such an approach as an 
alienable property, to be assigned away provide consent is given 
 
6.  Conclusion and further work  
 
Our investigation started with a common privacy problem in online 
investigations: In order to obtain data about a suspect, the police must 
disclose to the data controller (a bank, and ISP etc) the identity of the “person 
of interest”. This poses a privacy and reputation risk to the suspect: people 
often assume that “where there is smoke, there is fire”, and even being 
subject of a police investigation carries substantial reputation risks – holders 
of public office e.g. will frequently resign even at such an early stage of a 
criminal investigation. It also poses a risk for the police investigation and its 
integrity, as it can warn off suspects and increase their flight risk. A 
combination of technical and legal factors prevents the use of strategies to 
minimise these risks that are used in the offline environment. Traditional 
approaches to privacy protection online also struggle with this scenario, as 
they typically pitch state interests (here, the police) against those of the 
citizen. In our setting though, these interests converge. By looking at new and 
emerging conceptions of privacy that understand it less as an individual right 
only, but as a communal good that enables important social institutions in a 
democratic society, we were able to overcome this gridlock and suggest a 
combination  of technical, attitudinal and legal measures. Novel about this 
approach is in particular the notion of privacy as communal responsibility, 
which allows accepting small privacy risks for a larger number of people to 
prevent more serious privacy risks for other individuals.  
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Because this conception of privacy differs from the traditional jurisprudential 
conceptualisation, it raises several questions about the legal evaluation of our 
proposal.  We discussed possible legal foundations that allow the necessary 
data transfer, concluding that for both the most promising ones, a significant 
degree of public acceptance is crucial. The success of our proposal will 
therefore ultimately depend on empirical, social factors regarding risk 
assessment, solidarity and community loyalty. Further research should in 
particular look at social attitudes to “privacy risk sharing”, and how, if at all, it 
differs between different online communities. We noted above a slow but 
noticeable shift towards a greater concerns for privacy, and a greater 
willingness to prioritise it over investigative interests by the police. We should 
therefore expect uptake to be highest in those environments where mutual 
solidarity and a feeling of belonging is strongest, for instance voluntary 
internet based associations such as the community of Wikipedia editors, and 
the lowest where the community” is one of mere convenience, such as the 
community of Amazon customers”.  
 
Developing appropriate incentives is therefore one of the key tasks for future 
research. As the initial problem was caused by a combination of traditional 
legal concepts and their lack of “fit” with modern online environments, our 
solution too employed a combination of legal and technological approaches. 
Further research is therefore needed on legal, technological and 
organisational aspects alike. From a technological perspective, improving 
further our idea that for specific queries, different ratios between “camouflage” 
and “real” data are better than a “one size fits it all approach” will be further 
explored. This involves studying further the balance between number of foils, 
sensitivity of data and resulting risks. The challenge here is also to balance 
protection from risk against communication complexity in both legally and 
technologically sound ways. Exploring different ways to balance 
communication complexity, different key sizes and the ratio between 
interesting/extra data that is sent to the investigators should result in a 
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number of typical risk profiles, which can lead to partly automated choice of 
protocols.  
 
A different task will be to extend our approach beyond the simple model of a 
one off query of the type typically encountered in police investigations. Were 
the police to make several queries about the same suspect to the same data 
controller in a short period of time, the controller might be able to triangulate 
the identity of the suspect after all. This would still require much more effort 
than they have to invest at present, but would at least be theoretically 
possible.  Multiple queries of this type are rare, due to police operational 
reasons (and also legal constraints), much more common however are of 
course request for the long term surveillance of an account in situations where 
the goal is prevention of future crimes rather than investigation of a past crime 
as in our scenario. A natural extension of our idea would therefore to be the 
study of long term, real time surveillance operations which inevitably would 
demand much more from the “foils”. Our approach to think of PETs as 
communal tasks should either way make a valuable contribution to the range 
of PET tools that are available. In the past, they reflected the libertarian, 
individualistic concept of privacy law, equipping individuals with protective 
tools that “build walls around them” within which they can keep their data safe. 
By contrast, our approach is a tool for the emerging understanding of privacy 
as a public good, where the protection of anonymity becomes a communal 
task, where we are strong only when united.   
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